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ALRC Review of Sedition Laws 
 
Submission by John R Pyke 
 
Dear Commissioners,  
 
I quite take your (and Mr Ruddock’s) point that some of the criticisms of the amendments 
made by last year’s Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) were misconceived (it’s amazing how 
many lawyers didn’t understand an ‘evidential burden’) , but there are nonetheless some 
serious flaws, and some plain clumsy drafting, in the Act as it finally passed.  In my 
submission, there is nothing particularly oppressive or scary about the new sedition 
section in the Criminal Code, though the drafting is an appalling muddle.  The worse 
feature of the Act was that it left the absurd and oppressive Unlawful Associations 
provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 intact, and even suggested, by amending one section, 
that they had been re-endorsed by Parliament as appropriate for modern times.  I will deal 
with the new sedition section and related sections first, and then with the old, and very 
bad, Part IIA of the 1914 Act. 
 
Treason and Sedition sections of the Criminal Code – a mess 
 
I find it hard to answer your questions about sedition without discussing treason and 
treachery also.  The sedition offence really cannot be considered separately; the treason, 
treachery and sedition offences should be rationalised at the same time, and harmonized.   
 
Since our loyalty these days should be to the nation and its people and its constitution, 
rather than a personal grovelling to the Sovereign or her Ministers, the core notion of 
treason these days should be actively-manifested disloyalty to the nation – using violence 
in an attempt to overthrow constitutional government or waging war against Australia.  A 
modern use for the word sedition, then, is basically incitement to treason – whether it 
should be a separate offence at all is discussed below.   
 
Treason under s 80.1 – both under-broad and over-broad 
 
As various offences have been transferred from the 1914 Act to the Code, with at least 
partly-modernized drafting at the time of the transfer, anomalies have arisen.  In 
particular, doing things with an intent to overthrow the Constitution remains ‘treachery’ 
in s 24AA of the 1914 Act, whereas urging others to do those same things with the same 
intent is ‘sedition’ in the new s 80.2 of the Code.   If, as I have suggested, treason should 
be seen in modern times as compassing actively-manifested disloyalty to the nation, s 
80.1(1) should logically include some of the things that have been left in the ‘treachery’ 
offence, in particular para 1(a) and sub-s (2).  [And then para 1(b) really belongs with the 
Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978, having nothing to do with 
treachery or treason towards Australia.].   
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Conversely, it is inappropriate that every attack on the Sovereign, the Governor-General 
or Prime Minister should be regarded as treason.  If someone murders the PM for reasons 
not connected with an intention to overthrow constitutional government (for example, to 
think the unthinkable, because of a love triangle), it is not treason in the sense in which 
any modern person would use the word, it is simply murder.  It can be punished under 
State or Territory law (and if the Commonwealth wanted to provide a specific offence of 
murder of a Minister it would have constitutional power to do so).  Of course, if the 
murder is part of an attempt to overthrow constitutional government, treason is being 
committed but the treason is the attempt to overthrow constitutional government and the 
murder is merely part of the scenario.  So I suggest that before a rational s 80.2 can be 
drafted s 80.1 should be redrafted to fit modern notions – omit the murder of important 
people and include violent attempt to overthrow constitutional government.  Most of the 
later paragraphs in s 80.1 may well belong there (levying war against the 
Commonwealth, instigating an armed invasion, etc) though there should be a clear 
statement either in s 80.1 or 80.3 that to merely express opposition to a war or Australia’s 
engagement in armed hostilities is not to “assist” the enemy under paras 80.1(1) (e) and 
(f).   
 
The word, and the offence, of “sedition” 
 
You ask whether “sedition” is the appropriate term for the conduct proscribed by the new 
s 80.2.  I am ambivalent about this – the word is derived from a Latin word generally 
translated as insurrection, and insurrection against a democratically-elected government, 
ought to be a crime, but on the other hand for many centuries in English law “sedition” 
was virtually a synonym for “opposition”, and mere opposition to government policies 
certainly ought not to be a crime.  On balance, I suggest it would be better if a phrase like 
“inciting (or urging) insurrection” were used – or, since the section immediately follows 
the treason section, “inciting (or urging) treason”.  And that, of course, raises the question 
whether there is any need for a sedition section at all because s 11.4 (Incitement) would 
work with s 80.2 to create an incitement to treason offence in any case.  All that is 
required is that the treason offence be drafted so that everything the incitement of which 
should be punishable as ‘sedition’ is included and everything the incitement of which 
should not be punished is not included, 
 
Section 80.2 – a grab-bag of unrelated provisions 
 
 If there is to be a separate ‘sedition’ or ‘incitement to treason’ section, then some of the 
sections of s 80.2 belong there while others do not.  I suggest that sub-ss (1) and (7) 
belong in such a section, but sub-ss (3) and (5) do not.  If the violence urged against the 
conduct of an election or within the community is so severe that it threatens constitutional 
government, then the urging will be an offence under sub-s (1) anyway; if it is not that 
severe it is just silly to call it ‘sedition’ or any synonym. The offences in these two sub-
sections certainly ought to be offences, but sub-s (3) belongs in the Electoral Act or 
another division of the Code, and sub-s (5) belongs in the Racial Discrimination Act or 




Should ‘urging’ be an offence anyway? 
 
Your Issues Paper quotes a number of submissions to the Senate Committee to the effect 
that the creation of ‘urging’ offences is an interference with free speech, and you quoted 
Lord Dahrendorf (para 6.25) as saying that ‘rants should be rejected with argument, not 
with police and prisons’.  I have a good deal of sympathy with this, but the problem is 
that rants do sometimes succeed in urging people to action.  Even the international human 
rights instruments urge signatories to prohibit incitement to war and racial hatred, and 
recent Security Council resolutions have called upon nations to prohibit incitement to 
terrorism.  My conclusion is that these ‘urging’ offences are generally appropriate, 
particularly in light of the availability of the ‘defences’ in s 80.3 (which should of course 
be amended to apply to incitements to commit the s 80.1 offence if a separate s 80.2 is 
omitted).     
 
However, I suggest that the maximum penalties should be reconsidered.  The seriousness 
of an incitement surely varies according to the likelihood that it will be successful, and is 
most serious when it is in fact successful.  [As you note in the Issues Paper, the US 
Supreme Court has sometimes gone further, and suggested that ranting that has no 
likelihood of triggering criminal action cannot constitutionally be penalized.]  I 
recommend that the maximum penalty for mere urging (under s 11.4 as well as s 80.2, 
should the latter section remain) should be no more than two years, with the option of 
summary trial in which case the maximum should be six months, but that the penalty for 
‘successful’ incitement, where an actual offence has resulted, should be governed by the 
scale in s 11.4 (which would mean that the penalty for successfully inciting a treasonous 




When I first read s 80.3 I thought its inclusion was ridiculous, because no sane person 
would think that any of the conduct listed in sub-s(1) could amount to a prima facie 
breach of s 80.1 or 80.2 anyway.  I suppose it was included because when one mentions 
‘treason’ or ‘sedition’ people who have read a bit of history immediately think of the 
historic definitions, under which any criticism of the government was a seditious libel.  
However, anyone who reads ss 80.1 and 80.2 as Humpty recommended – start at the 
beginning, and read the words in order until you come to the end -  should realise that 
these sections do not replicate the archaic law.  If you can persuade the parliament to 
amend s 80.1 further, as I have suggested above, it will be even more clear.  I suppose it 
does not hurt to include the ‘defences’, but it would be more appropriate to recast s 80.3 
as a ‘scope’ or quasi-definitional section and preface sub-s (1) with “For avoidance of 
doubt, it is declared that…” so as to make it clear that in enacting ss 80.1 and 80.2 the 
Parliament did not dream that the words might possibly be interpreted so as to restrict 
ordinary democratic criticism.  If sub-ss (3) and (5) are moved to other Acts, or other 




However, as noted above, there is one area where a clarification of the range of the 
offence would be useful.  That is in respect of the provisions about ‘assisting, by any 
means whatever,’ an enemy.  Section 80.1 already includes a couple of ‘Red Cross’ 
paragraphs making it clear that to give humanitarian aid is not prohibited.  It should also 
be made clear that to express the opinion that Australia should not be involved in a war or 
military action is also not to assist the enemy within the meaning of the section.  Perhaps 
para (f) should also be amended to refer to ‘conduct that actively assists’ rather than 
‘conduct that assists by any means whatever’.  
 
Since, in my view, the ‘defences’ are better described as clarifications of what ss 80.1 and 
80.2 are intended to cover and not cover, it is also absurd to say that the defendant has an 
evidential burden in respect of them.  Whether someone is urging violent overthrow of 
the Constitution or merely urging another person ‘to attempt to lawfully procure a change 
to any matter established by law, policy or practice’ is surely a matter of legal analysis of 
what was said.  The defendant’s evidence of his/her motives (the ‘good faith’ element) 
might be relevant in borderline cases, but to put an onus on the defendant to raise a 
‘defence’ in cases where it is clear that nothing treasonous was going on would be absurd 
and oppressive, if it actually meant anything.  
 
The fault elements 
 
I must say that I cannot understand how one could intentionally urge a person to 
overthrow something by force or violence, but be reckless as to whether that something 
was the Constitution, the Government or the lawful authority of the Government.  Surely 
one must be aware of what one is advocating the overthrow of?  Unless someone from 
the government can present you with a convincing argument as to the need for these 
weird ‘recklessness applies’ provisions, I suggest that they should be omitted, and the 




The claim in s 80.4 to extended geographical jurisdiction is truly extraordinary.  It would 
appear to make the action of any person of another country who fights against Australia a 
criminal offence against our law.  Now it may be about time that waging war became a 
crime under the law of all nations, but so far we still seem to observe the rule that enemy 
combatants (at least, in a declared war) are not regarded as criminals.  There may be 
some justification for the laws to apply extraterritorially to Australian citizens, but then s 
80.4 should refer to category A extended jurisdiction under s 15.1, not category D under s 
15.4.   
 
Old Unlawful Associations provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 – archaic 
nonsense that should be repealed 
 
 
There are several things wrong with Part IIA of the 1914 Act.  Relatively trivially, some 
of the language is archaic (‘bring the sovereign into hatred and contempt’, ‘urge 
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disaffection’), though being in conjunction with ‘intention to use force or violence’ I 
suppose those words by themselves do little harm. 
 
More seriously, the whole idea of prohibiting associations so as to punish consequential 
acts – being an officer, giving money, publications – is somewhat suspect.  I endorse the 
Gibbs Committee’s remarks quoted in the Issues Paper at par 3.87.  In current conditions 
I suppose the Terrorist Organisations provisions in Division 102 of the Code may be 
necessary, but it is not necessary to have a whole set of other, overlapping, provisions in 
the 1914 Act as well. 
 
Then there is a pair of provisions which constitute an improper curb on freedom of 
political debate.  Section 30A includes a body that advocates ‘the overthrow by force… 
of the established government of any other civilised country’ in the definition of unlawful 
associations, and s 30C (a section applying to individuals, quite anomalously placed in 
the Part dealing with associations) makes it an offence for an individual to advocate the 
overthrow of such a government.  But just what is the mark of a ‘civilised country’?  If it 
was one that had a democratically elected government or even a government that 
generally respected human rights (a civilised government), I might not take exception to 
these sections.  But the more obvious interpretation would seem to include any country 
with cities , a central government, and some history of activity in the fine arts and 
sciences – so presumably Iraq was civilised even when governed by the uncivilised 
Saddam Hussein (though it may not be now), which means that the Commonwealth 
government is an unlawful association and, if overthrowing Saddam was ever formally a 
part of Liberal Party policy, so is the Liberal Party.   
 
We should be free in Australia to express our opposition to undemocratic and oppressive 
governments in other parts of the world, and even to declare our regret that the people in 
those countries do not rise up against their oppressors – even if it does cause some 
embarrassment to our government in its conduct of external and trade relations.  If we go 
so far as to recruit fighters for the revolution, or to export arms to the freedom-fighters, 
we will be caught by the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978, and I 
suppose I can accept that for the sake of friendly relations with other countries.  But it 
should not be a criminal offence for us merely to advocate that the people of Zimbabwe 
should get rid of Mugabe, or that the people of West Papua should throw out the 
Indonesian army.  If that embarrasses the government they will just have to keep 
explaining to the annoyed foreign governments that we permit free speech in Australia.  
 
The Gibbs Committee was right – the whole of Part IIA should be repealed. 
 
I would be happy to address any other issues you may wish to raise with me. 
 
 
John R Pyke 
Lecturer, QUT Law School 
9 April 2006
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Response to DP 71 




I think most of the proposals in your Discussion Paper make a lot of sense.  I have just a few 
comments. 
 
1.  Heading of section 80.2 
 
Although I suggested a different way of revising s 80.2 in my earlier submission, I can see 
some logic in continuing to have one section that deals with urging violence against the 
government, interfering with elections and stirring up interracial violence, as long as it is not 
all called “sedition”.  However, I suggest that your proposed new section heading doesn’t 
summarise the content of the section much better than the old one did; it sums up the effect of 
sub-ss (3) and (5)  well enough but sits rather oddly with sub-s (1).  It is true that, should the 
“urging” proscribed by that sub-section result in a successful attack on the Constitution and 
government, the ultimate victim (supposing an Islamist, communist or Nazi dictatorship to be  
established) would be political liberty - but the conduct directly proscribed by the sub-section 
is much more aptly described as an offence against constitutional government than as an 
offence against that more remote target, and even-more-abstract concept, “political liberty”.  
So I suggest that “Offences against constitutional government and public order” would 
encapsulate the content of the section rather better than your proposed heading.  This would 
then flow across to the Part heading as well. 
 
Apart from that matter of terminology, you have rather surprised me by quoting two passages 
from my earlier submission with apparent approval, but then failing to recommend any 
change to the current laws that would meet the criticism I advanced in those passages. 
 
 
2. The strange mixture of intent and recklessness 
 
At the text to footnote 59 of the DP, you quote my comment that it is hard to understand how 
someone could intentionally urge others to overthrow the government, but be reckless as to 
whether the target was the government.  Yet you have recommended leaving sub-ss (2), (4) 
and (6) – the ones that begin “recklessness applies to the element of the offence…” – in place.  
I repeat my criticism – I cannot understand how someone would intentionally urge others to 
use violence against a target without having a very clear idea, and making it very clear, what 
the target was.  It may be that the drafters’ intention in including the recklessness provisions 
was to cover a kind of “recklessness as between alternative characterisations”, so that the 
prosecution would not have to particularize whether the target (using sub-s (1) as the 
example) was a specific one of  the Constitution, or the government, or the government’s 
lawful authority, but it seems to me that these sections, read with s 5.4 of the Code, do not 
actually produce that result.  If that was the intention, it would be easy enough to add a phrase 
like “or any combination of two or more of the above” to the sub-section.  But with that 




3. Persistence of “assist the enemy” provisions in the Crimes Act 1914 
 
Another one of my remarks that you thought was good enough to quote (text to fn 136) was 
that the treason and treachery offences should be considered and rationalized at the same time 
as the “sedition” offence – yet I do not think you have gone as far in this direction as your 
terms of reference would permit.  An objectionable feature of both s 24AA of the Crimes Act 
1914 (treachery) and s 80.1 of the Code (treason) is that they prohibit conduct that “assists, by 
any means whatever,..” an enemy (which could mean that it is an offence to simply say “we 
should not be fighting X”).  You have recommended that in the case of s 80.1 these words 
should be altered to “materially assists”, but you have not made the same recommendation for 
s 24AA.   I know your terms of reference did not mention the Crimes Act 1914, other than 
Part IIA, and you have recommended a further review of sections including s 24AA, but your 
terms of reference did include “any related matter”.   I suggest that this aspect of s 24AA is so 
closely related to the general problems with ss 80.1 and 80.2 that you should make at least 
this one specific recommendation with respect to it. 
 
Other than those remarks, I congratulate you on the DP, and I hope that most of the proposals 






John R Pyke 
Lecturer, QUT Law School 
[Dated 9 April 2006 by mistake, 
actually submitted 3 July 2006]   
 
 
 
 
 
